

# Viewing Knowledge Bases as Qualitative Models

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## 1. Introduction

With the **growing** interest in expert systems in academia and industry, one question recurs that never seems to receive a satisfying answer: How are expert systems different from conventional programs? Different perspectives suggest different answers. In terms of programming language, expert systems are programs written in “logic,” “rules,” or “frames” (Friedland, 1985). From the perspective of new computational capabilities, expert systems are programs that can explain their reasoning (Davis, 1986). Or considering how these programs are used, expert systems are consultants, monitors, designers, etc. (Hayes-Roth, et al., 1983). But these perspectives are not completely satisfying because they fail to explain how conventional programs are inherently different: Aren’t **Fortran** conditional statements “rules”? Why is it difficult to write a **Fortran** program that can explain its reasoning? Why isn’t a Bayesian diagnostic program an expert system?

An alternative point of view, which this paper develops, considers the nature of the knowledge encoded in these programs. Expert systems deal with heuristics, uncertain knowledge (Feigenbaum, 1977). Their reasoning is qualitative, not in terms of precise measures. But in the AI literature, the term “qualitative reasoning,” characterizing an important and growing subarea of research, has been almost exclusively applied to programs with some kind of *simulation model* of a physical system, such as an electronic circuit (Bobrow, 1984, Chandrasekaran and Milne, 1985). This common definition of qualitative reasoning excludes the majority of expert systems, and, as this paper argues, it is largely responsible for the gap in our understanding.

What is an expert system? A simple answer can be given, one that is half-known and has been half-stated by many people: Expert systems contain qualitative models of the world, in contrast with quantitative models, which involve mathematical laws, such as in physics, electronics, and economics (Padulo and Arbib, 1974). The idea is half-stated in the common view that AI is concerned with *symbolic programming* (Harmon and King, 1985), but this is not a satisfying distinction because numbers are symbols, too. An alternative description, “non-numeric programming,” avoids this ambiguity and is also widely used. However, the emphasis on “programming” has distracted us; the idea that these programs contain *non-numeric models* has been generally ignored. Describing AI as “non-numeric science and engineering” is more to the point: *Artificial Intelligence is the study of computational techniques for acquiring, representing, and using qualitative models of physical, perceptual, cognitive, and social systems.*

The purpose of this paper is to give this definition force by enriching our understanding of what qualitative models are. Briefly, a qualitative model describes some system in the world in terms of causal, compositional, or subtype relations among objects and events. One of the most important ideas of this paper is that there is a well-established repertoire of methods for representing qualitative models-networks based on the idea of prototype subsumption, state-

transition, and structural and procedural composition. **By** studying and using these network representations, **AI** has established a foundation for a science and engineering of qualitative models.

From early on, we have followed the approach of decomposing knowledge from how it is used, abstracting knowledge structures and reasoning procedures, and formulating an increasingly more general understanding of what knowledge engineering and knowledge bases are all about (Swartout, 1981, Clancey, 1983a, Clancey, 1983b, McDermott, 1983, Szolovits, 1985, Clancey, 1985, Smith, 1985). It is now apparent that knowledge bases contain *models of systems* in the world. Reasoning involves *sequences of tasks*, such as “monitoring” and “diagnosis,” by which an understanding or model of specific situations is related to action plans (Section 3). Programs use a simple *repertoire of qualitative modeling techniques*, commonly called “knowledge representations” (Section 4). The idea of a *situation-specific model* makes concrete what programs know and how problem solving can be described in terms of model-manipulation operators (Section 5). Finally, an historical perspective shows how **AI**’s concern with adaptiveness and rationality of the autonomous agent emphasizes the *role* of a model as what a problem solver knows (hence, “knowledge base”) (Section 6). This has been to the detriment of understanding the primary characteristic of knowledge in terms of *models* that partition the world, viewing it selectively and making it coherent for some purpose.

## 2. The need for a synthesis

Given the generality of the term “model” and the all-encompassing nature of this paper, it is worthwhile addressing a few possible objections up front.

First, we tend to adopt an idealized view of what a model is. Observing how impoverished our programs are, we tend to say that they are not models or, at least, “not real models.” This critical point of view is valuable for carrying our research forward, but it creates a distinction that only confuses what we are doing and have accomplished. This paper argues that knowledge base structures are models because they describe what is happening in the world and provide a basis for action, that is they *function* as models.

Second, when a number of pieces are brought together, it may look like the picture was always obvious. For example, recalling the idea of a “frame” (Minsky, 1975)-a prototypic description providing a basis for explaining what happens in the world, making predictions, and taking action-it may seem obvious that frames are a kind of qualitative model. *But why don’t we teach it this way?* Our understanding of our field is fragmented and inconsistent. Consider:

- Classification and causal network descriptions are commonly used for modeling physical processes (Lehnert, 1978, Weiss, et al., 1978, Szolovits, 1985), but this work is not integrated in the collection, “Qualitative Reasoning about Physical Systems”

(Bobrow, 1984).

- When we refer to a knowledge base as an “expert model” or “consultation model” (Weiss, 1979), we tend to forget that it contains models of systems in the world. By separating out the system descriptions in a knowledge base, we can begin to identify particular kinds of network structures as *different ways of modeling processes* (Section 4).
- In most medical expert systems, a diagnosis is taken to be the *name* of a disease rather than a coherent description of what is happening in the world—a model—that causally relates states and processes. Perhaps because the programs do not structurally simulate pathophysiological processes, researchers have not thought about inference in terms of model construction (Section 5).
- Instructional research has emphasized that people generally have *some* model of how a system works or what procedure to follow for solving a problem, sometimes buggy and incomplete (Gentner and Stevens, 1983). From this, we might expect that expert system explanations would relate the program’s model to the user’s, perhaps focusing on violated expectations. Instead, we describe explanation in terms of articulating what the program knows and what it did (Davis, 1976, Swartout, 1981, Hasling, et al., 1984). By definition, the program has something the user does not have, “expertise.” Thus, we think in terms of “transferring the expertise” (Davis, 1976, Clancey, 1979), rather than *relating alternative models*.

Similarly, the familiar line that AI is “constructing computer programs which exhibit behavior we call ‘intelligent behavior’ when we observe it in human beings” (Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963) has provided a useful focus, but leaves out the modeling methodology upon which our work is based.

### 3. The inference structure of expert systems

Expert systems contain descriptions of system behavior and design, which are *models*, in the usual sense of selective abstractions that allow explanation and/or prediction of events in the world. The knowledge encoded in expert systems *functions* as a model, regardless of what representational form it takes. In this section we describe *what expert systems do* in terms of generic tasks for analyzing and synthesizing systems. The next section lays out a spectrum of representational methods.

All expert systems make assertions about what is true in the world or what actions might be taken: The patient has a fever, the infection might be meningitis, penicillin is a possible therapy, etc. If we lay out how assertions are related as chains of inference, we observe

**regularities.** A kind of secondary structure emerges. One such structure, termed “heuristic classification,” involves systematic abstraction, association between class hierarchies, and refinement (Clancey, 1985). The inference process, that is, the order in which inferences are made, is of course important, but it is a different issue.

Heuristic classification is a problem-solving method by which solutions are selected from a set of pre-enumerated alternatives. The question naturally arises, for **what** kinds of problems is heuristic classification useful? One approach is to consider what kinds of things might be selected from a list of pre-enumerated alternatives. Examples include: user models, **items** in a catalog, diagnoses, skeletal plans, numeric models (Clancey, 1985).

Continuing our attempt to generalize, are there patterns in **what** data and solutions can be? What kinds of things are classified and heuristically related? We start by laying out common sequences:

<b>Inference Structure</b>	<b>Example Program<sup>1</sup></b>
patient -> disease -> therapy	MYCIN
reader -> book	GRUNDY
customer -> wine	WINE ADVISOR
structure -> numeric model -> analysis program	SACON
circuit behavior -> fault	SOPHIE
causal reasoning bug -> misconception -> instruction	WHY
program bug -> misconception	MENO

Several generalizations can be made:

1. The “things” being related are *models*, that is, general, abstracted descriptions of specific things in the world. Different terminology—“disease prototype,” “user stereo type,” “numeric model,” “structural abstraction”—has tended to obscure this basic pattern.

2. Models are related in a limited number of ways, by what are called *generic tasks*. We introduce the idea of a *system* and redescribe the things being related in terms of an operation performed to some system at each step (Clancey, 1985):

```
specify -> design -> assemble
monitor -> diagnose -> modify
-identify -> predict
monitor -> control
```

For example, “patient -> disease” is replaced by “monitor (detect abnormal body system states and environmental influences) -> diagnose (describe and determine cause of the malfunctioning **subsystem's** structural and state abnormalities).”

3. We can extend the argument beyond heuristic classification to include all expert

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<sup>1</sup>References: MYCIN: (Shortliffe, 1976); GRUNDY: (Rich, 1979); WINE ADVISOR: Teknowledge, Inc.; SACON: (Bennett, 1979); SOPHIE: (Brown, et al., 1982); WHY: (Stevens, et al., 1982); MENO: (Soloway, et al., 1981)



systems. The basis for this is simple: **Patterns** like “monitor -> diagnose -> repair” are very familiar; we know that they go beyond how diagnoses and repairs are reasoned about. For example, we can return to the pattern of the wine advisor (“specify -> design’\*) and include **R1** because it relates a customer’s requirements to a VAX system configuration.

We aim for completeness, but of course establishing that these generalizations are true for every expert system is a daunting task. We can only consider them to be hypotheses, albeit based on considerable experience, and see if they hold up to further analysis.


In introducing the idea of a “system” as the focus of reasoning, we view tasks not in isolation (as described in (Hayes-Roth, et al., 1983)), but as the range of things **that** we can do to any given system. On this basis, we can begin to argue about the completeness of the list of tasks. For example, we can reformulate Davis’s idea of fault models in these terms. Fault models make explicit “what might have been done to a system” to cause faulty behavior (Davis, 1984):

- Monitor the system and determine how it is different from the intended design: Structure intended to change, such as a gate, may be fixed; components may be functioning wrong or have the wrong structure (e.g., a short).
- . The system may have been assembled wrong (e.g., chip flaw).
- The design may be wrong.
- The specification may be wrong.

Davis emphasizes the heuristic value of ordering these considerations. Our system-model orientation suggests that “fault models” can be generalized **to** all systems and generated from the set of generic tasks. Specifically, we could add “wrong prediction” (observer’s expectations were incorrect) and “wrong control” (wrong input for desired output) to Davis’s list.

We are now in a position to generalize once again, condensing the four sequences of generic tasks into one sequence (Figure 3-1). In simple terms, we relate desired or observed *system behavior* to a *system description* to some *plan* for taking action in the world or *expectation* about what will happen in **the** world. Common names for action plans are: “assembly plan,” “instructional plan,” “therapy plan,” and “control plan.” The intermediate design or identification might describe a *subsystem*, as in the relation between a patient and his infection. Also, in moving to the third stage, we often are describing a *containing system* that will carry out the assembly, modification, or control process, as in the relation between a client and his vacation plan or a design for a molecular structure and an experiment plan.

Again, this is a description of inference structure, not the order in which inferences are made. For example, specification and design are commonly iterative. In cognitive modeling for instruction, we work backwards from an artifact (say a student’s computer program), to an implicit design (the model or plan for the program), to models of the environment in which



**Figure 3-i:** General inference structure for reasoning about systems

the artifact is to function (beliefs about what the program is supposed to do) and the components out of which it is made (beliefs about the programming language) (Johnson and Soloway, 1984). Note that for the special case of heuristic classification, system models and action plans are selected from pre-enumerated descriptions.

#### 4. Representation of qualitative models

By relating qualitative methods for modeling systems, we can see our enterprise as a whole. One possible taxonomy distinguishes between the explanatory power of classification and simulation models (Figure 4- 1).

Classification models can be used to *recognize* processes, to “account for behavior” of a system, by naming or categorizing the observed pattern (Minsky, 1963). As a phenomenological description, this corresponds, in general terms, to the idea of *frames* (Minsky, 1975), with the temporal nature of processes made explicit in the idea of *scripts* (Schank, 1975, Stevens, et al., 1982) and described more carefully as an “encapsulated history” (Forbus, 1984). A process description identifies a sequence of events that happen over time, spread over several locations (Ackoff, 1974). For example, an infectious process involves intrusion of an organism into the body, movement to a favorable growth site, response by the body, and inflammation. Typically such descriptions are aggregated to reflect general properties and omit sequential details, thus treating the system as an “object” (e.g., descriptions of people as stereotypes (Rich, 1979)). Such descriptions are *models* because they provide an explanatory accounting of what happens in the world and a basis for action (Achinstein, 1983).

Simulation models, broadly construed, provide some description of how the system produces the observed behavior. The model is “runnable,” allowing predictions to be made of how a system will change given a set of initial conditions. A *behavioral simulation* describes how a system *appears*, in terms of “hidden states,” “observed manifestations,” and causal relations among them. A *functional simulation* model places behavior in a larger context, indicating the *role* it plays in achieving the properties of a larger system. For example, a functional model of a radio would refer to amplification and locking on to a broadcast station, while a behavioral model would only describe current flow and changing voltages. Functional models




Figure 4-1: Types of qualitative models of processes

*account for patterns in behavior and* indicate what larger goals these patterns satisfy (Kosslyn, 1980). As an abstraction, a function is something the system can accomplish in multiple ways, depending on its state and the demands of its environment (Ackoff, 1974).

Regarding completeness, classification and behavioral models do not necessarily characterize the full state of the system being reasoned about on any level of analysis, and cannot necessarily predict what state will follow from arbitrary initial conditions (for example, allowing that parts of the system are functioning normally). “Hidden” internal states may be described, but the purpose of transitions and how transitions follow from the structure of the system (the physical components) are not completely described (Weiss, et al., 1978, Szolovits, 1985).

In contrast, a functional model makes a claim about *completeness* of the explanation or system description. The purpose of the system is captured procedurally on multiple levels of abstraction, so states can be related to functional goals. For example, a functional model of diagnosis describes reasoning in terms of general goals for supporting and refining alternative explanations (Patil, 1981, Clancey, 1984), rather than behaviorally, in terms of domain-specific inferences.

Finally, a structure/function model, to which the term “qualitative model” is usually applied in AI research, **gives** a full accounting for each component in the system in terms of its role in fulfilling the function of the system. Thus, a functional/structural simulation constitutes a strong theory of the design of a system and the mechanism that lies behind observed behavior (De Kleer and Brown, 1984). A model may be functional, without a structural component, as in models of human problem solving, which typically mention brain components in only very general terms (Kosslyn, 1980).

Figure 4-2 summarizes the different perspectives by which qualitative models describe systems: as *processes* (a prototype hierarchy of I/O or cause/effect patterns); *states* (a graph of states linked by cause and subtype); *functions* (procedural modules hierarchically composed by I/O relations); and *structures* (physical components composing functional modules). The next step in the analysis, beyond the scope of this paper, is to relate these alternative models for recognizing a system and understanding its behavior to the demands of generic tasks (Section 3). Notice in particular that the qualitative modeling repertoire is not specific to physical systems; for example, similar techniques are used for modeling the cognitive processes of discourse, diagnosis, and planning.

CONCEPT	RELATION	COMMON NAME	PROGRAM EXAMPLES
I. PROCESS	SUBSUMPTION	PROTOTYPE CLASSIFICATION	(Pauker, 1977) (Lehnert, 1978)
II. STATE	CONDITIONAL TRANSITION (CAUSE)	CAUSAL NETWORK	(Brown, et al., 1973) (Rieger & Grinberg, 1977) (Weiss, et al., 1978)
III. FUNCTION	COMPOSITION	PROCEDURAL NETWORK	(Sacerdoti, 1974) (Brown, et al., 1982) (Clancey, 1984)
IV. STRUCTURE	COMPOSITION	STRUCTURE-FUNCTION MODEL	(de Kleer, 1979) (Genesereth, 1982)

**Figure 4-2:** Conceptual structure of network representations for systems

This framework can be **used as a** starting point for understanding the value of multiple representations. For example, it is common for a causal-associational state network to be mapped to a disease process hierarchy (Weiss and Kulikowski, 1984, Szolovits, 1985, Clancey and Letsinger, 1984), thus relating a descriptive view of current system behavior to a developmental accounting. Process descriptions can be combined with a structural simulation for coping with complex **or unusual** situations (Bylander and Chandrasekaran, 1985, Koton, 1985, Fink, 1985). Qualitative models can be useful for controlling and interpreting quantitative simulations (Brown, 1975, Apte and Weiss, 1985). Finally, note that both

simulation and classification models can be quantitative (Nilsson, 1965), so the classification/simulation and qualitative/quantitative distinctions are orthogonal.

## 5. Example: Applying the model perspective to diagnosis

A diagnosis explains why observed system behavior is different from expected, generally in terms of a structural variation from the design. Corresponding to the types of qualitative models (Figure 4-1), the diagnostic process takes different forms:

- recognizing a disorder as a set of features;
- constructing an “historical” accounting for behavior (usually partial because only abnormal manifestations are explained, not normal functioning of the system); and
- constructing a “complete” description of the system being diagnosed (accounting for both abnormal and normal system behavior in terms of structural components).

As a model, a medical diagnosis is not just the name of a disease, but a *causal story* that relates the manifestations that need to be explained (because they are abnormal) to the processes that brought them about. Such an argument, shown as an inference network in Figure 5-1, is called a *patient-specific model* (Patil, 1981). In simple terms, it copies over from models of system processes, states, function, and structure the concepts and relations that are believed to hold in this particular problem.




Figure 5-1: Partial diagnostic model in NEOMYCIN

The process of diagnosis can be viewed as the construction of a “proof tree.” Proceeding upwards, the explanation becomes more specific in terms of the cause or subtype of the process that is occurring. At some intermediate stage when solving the problem, the network is disconnected and partial (Figure 5-1). The state-transition model indicates that seizures might be caused by increased intracranial pressure; this link is placed in the patient-specific model.

There **is** evidence for acute meningitis, but the alternative hypotheses have not been **related**. **Is** there some underlying cause or process that could account for all of the manifestations? Could meningitis cause increased intracranial pressure? Thus, the problem solver returns to the general model to search for connections that will allow a coherent explanation to be constructed.

While this description of diagnosis has intuitive appeal, most expert systems and their developers never check to see whether all of the findings are covered by the final “diagnosis.” Cursory examination of the inference network (as shown for *NEOMYCIN* in Figure 5-1) reveals surprising gaps in the program’s model: Abnormal findings needing to be explained are found to be unrelated to the most likely diagnosis. How can we account for the fact that these gaps go unnoticed?

In part, our language is too loose: The program prints out the *name* of a disorder, and we say, “The program has *made* a diagnosis.” We don’t think of a diagnosis as a description of a system and how it evolved. Instead, emphasis is on “inferring the right answer.” We view inference in terms of adding up belief or finding a linear path of assertions that ends in the right diagnosis.

Accumulating evidence by some scoring function (Pople, 1982) or certainty factor scheme—the predominant approach in expert system diagnosis—disguises the *structural* aspects of diagnosis, that is, how the hypotheses explain the findings. It would be difficult to find a better example of the proverbial groping around the elephant, with each researcher proclaiming a different aspect of the nature of diagnosis:

- In *INTERNIST*, a scoring function reduces a hypothesis score by the “importance” of the observed findings it fails to explain (Pople, 1982).
- Viewing diagnosis in terms of traversing a network of processes and states, *CASNET* extracts the longest path from findings to a disease process (Weiss, et al., 1978).
- Reggia defines the best diagnosis as one that satisfies the principle of parsimony, covering the largest set of findings (Reggia, et al., 1984).
- In *CADUCEUS*, orthogonal relations and the possibility of multiple disorders make linear network traversal combinatorially intractable. Operators piece together state and process descriptions according to subtype and causal relations (Pople, 1982).
- In *NEOMYCIN*, diagnostic operators focus on, group, refine, and support the *differential*, the most-specific state and process descriptions that explain the findings (Clancey, 1984).
- Finally, in *ABEL*, these ideas are brought together, so that a diagnosis is a constructed graph that explains the findings on multiple levels of detail (Patil, 1981).

Thus, research has progressed from viewing diagnosis in terms of inferring the name of disease by chains of reasoning (*MYCIN*), or finding the best match (*INTERNIST*), to *reasoning about* a constructed inference network, the causal story. Inference is described not in terms of particular evidence rules and backchaining, but in terms of operators for manipulating the

patient-specific model.

An **interesting** result is that the uncertainty of the diagnosis no longer resides in a numeric score, but in the structure of the model: Alternative hypotheses are ranked by how well they cover the findings (Patil, 1981). Furthermore, by taking into account the *purpose* of the model, the issue becomes not to derive a precise measure of belief, but to determine if the uncertainty needs to be resolved. Medical diagnoses, like all engineering models, are partial. They need only be good enough to discriminate among choices for action, perhaps allowing for monitoring successful completion of a plan and improving an inadequate choice (Petroski, 1985). However, today's programs make a diagnosis independently of how it will be used, or therapeutic distinctions are implicit in the disorder classification. For example, MYCIN does not distinguish among types of viral meningitis because they are treated equivalently. Further development of this point would contrast the engineering demands of diagnosis with *scientific* modeling of systems (as in Dendral (Buchanan, et al., 1969)), which seeks mechanistic detail, and naive device models (Kieras, 1984, Suchman, 1985).

Even if a knowledge base lacks the detailed causal relations that enable reasoning about interactions as in ABEL, the patient-specific model can be useful. First, it can be used as a global perspective for controlling inference. For example, NEOMYCIN's patient-specific model indicates that unnecessary assertions are being made. Several new metarules prevent this, for example (stated negatively for clarity), "If a new disease hypothesis does not explain all abnormal findings, but some existing hypothesis does, then do not add the new hypothesis to the patient-specific model."

Second, as a form of output, the model (Figure 5-1) is a powerful knowledge acquisition tool. It reveals:

- Gaps in the knowledge base, evident by a missing link between an abnormal finding and an hypothesis (a feature we are exploiting in our teaching program, GUIDON-DEBUG (Clancey, et al., 1986)).
- Implicit inferences, evident by the program's inability to link terms such as "headache chronicity" and "cns finding duration" (something we must correct for the program to explain its reasoning).
- **Missing qualitative abstractions**, evident by a direct link between a numeric finding (e.g., "csf protein is 100") and a disease. We must make explicit what ranges are high or low and what is abnormal in order for the program to know what findings need to be explained.
- **Undirected causal links**, where no distinction is made between causes or correlated predispositions and effects (e.g., the patient's age is never an effect of a disease). Again, the program cannot know if its explanation is complete if it doesn't know what facts need to be explained.
- **Side-effects**, evident by links composing a causal relation with a **model-manipulation strategy** (e.g., if the csf is bloody, rule out bacterial-meningitis). The model perspective disciplines the rule writer to record the correct causal association (bloody csf is caused by a subarachnoid hemorrhage) and to write control rules that reason about alternative explanations (such as the metarule shown above).

**These observations do not mean** that the classification/behavioral approach should be abandoned in favor of structure-function models' First, diagnosis based on structure-function **has generally** been restricted to component failures, **rather** than interactions the system has with its environment. Given the open nature of the world, an "experiential" classification model appears to be practical, and perhaps necessary. Second, regardless of diagnostic value, classification and behavioral descriptions represent what people know in domains such as medicine and everyday reasoning (**Rosch**, 1978, Feltovich, et al., 1984, Kolodner, 1984). Third, belief maintenance descriptions of inference (e.g., (De Kleer and Brown, 1984)) emphasize model coherence, but do not capture the structural aspects of situation-specific model manipulation, evident in the description of diagnostic tasks as graph-construction operators (Patil, 1981, Pople, 1982, Clancey, 1984). In applying the model perspective to classification and behavioral descriptions, we are not dismissing them as inferior, but rather recognizing their status as models and gaining a measure of quality for diagnostic inference,

Finally, the model-based perspective of Figure **5-1** is compatible with the blackboard paradigm (Hayes-Roth, **1984**), viewing reasoning in terms of: A shared database; flexible, opportunistic operators for posting and modifying solution elements; and a separate control structure for scheduling inference. However, the blackboard is not *just* a database. It is a situation-specific model of a system, made apparent by the use of different blackboards or "panels" to separate different systems and action plans. The study of alternative kinds of models (Section 4) and the view of inference as model-manipulation operators is a step towards formalizing principles for structuring a blackboard and describing what "knowledge sources" do. This analysis also suggests that heuristic classification is not adequate for diagnosis and other systems problems when pre-enumerated processes or action plans can occur together and interact.

## **6. Historical perspective**

We can resolve **some** of the uncertainty about the nature of expert systems and AI in general by relating this work to other science and engineering perspectives, placing it in historical context, and defining it comparatively. This is the chapter that AI textbooks consistently omit. We need to tell students not just what our goals and methodology are, but how we got here and how what we're doing is different from traditional science and engineering.

Today we take for granted that the words "machine" and "intelligence" go together because the idea of a machine today allows for adaptivity (**McCorduck**, 1979). But this was not always so. For scientists and engineers of the past, a "mechanism" was the anti thesis of change and flexibility. It was something fixed, composed of known parts, and fully predictable. The "scientific perspective" in part had its origin in this mechanistic or deterministic conception of nature. Thus, the mysterious concepts of "a superhuman final cause" and "purpose" were rejected, and all observed behavior reduced to separate, discrete parts studied in isolation



(Frank, et al., 1948, Bertalanffy, 1968).

However, in this century, this view was **found to** be inadequate for understanding complex systems. The concept of goal was re-introduced in cybernetics by models of self-regulation, based on the concept of feedback (Wiener, 1961). Several sciences, including particularly biology and economics, turned to the study of systems not as “constitutive characteristics,” of elements in isolation, but as relations among elements (Bertalanffy, 1968). Thus, study turned from invariant properties (such as molecular weight) to properties of a complex, dependent on relations among interacting elements (such as *topological structure* of a molecule and the *function* of molecular units).

In modeling the *open* and *non-linear* character of systems, analytic techniques broadened to include concepts such as: “compartmentalization” (near decomposability (Simon, 1969)), topology, adaptiveness, information flow, state-transition, and rationality (Bertalanffy, 1968, Newell and Simon, 1972). In particular, these perspectives address the need to represent **discontinuities** (non-linearity) in system behavior: “Representation by differential equations is too restricted for a theory to include biological systems and calculating machines where **discontinuities** are ubiquitous” (Bertalanffy, 1968).

From this perspective, Artificial Intelligence merges the *teleological concepts* of choice, regulation, adaptiveness and rationality with the *modeling concepts* of set, graph, net, and automata theory and formal logic (Newell and Simon, 1972). Furthermore, emphasis has shifted from modeling systems in themselves, to modeling “self-directed personalities” (Frank, et al., 1948) that incorporate a model of the world, goals, and a reasoning process for solving particular problems. The idea of the *autonomous agent* crucially frames our research. To determine what could be the basis for rationality and adaptation, we have focused on the *individual* interacting with the world to solve some problem. In order to *generate* intelligent behavior in an autonomous agent, a program, we put inside a *representation* of the agent’s knowledge of the world and his goals. Rather than proving theorems about structures in themselves (as in graph theory), we use them to *represent* concepts and relations. Thus have evolved the well-known representational structures of our field: the augmented-transition network, the procedural network, the causal-association network, the semantic network, and so on.

In this historical context, we see that AI combines a framework for modeling (the idea of the autonomous agent) with qualitative modeling techniques. In describing AI, we have tended to emphasize the idea of generating intelligent behavior, and not made clear how our modeling techniques are different. Rather than numeric *measures*, we have devised methods for *describing* physical and cognitive systems. Our programs describe a system’s physical appearance (structure), behavior, goals, and role in a larger context (function). These relations are distinguished in our advanced representation languages (Bobrow, 1984, Brachman and

Levesque, 1985).

In the buzzword “knowledge,” we emphasize that what the problem solver knows or believes is central, **providing a** crucial focus for our research. But the term “knowledge” emphasizes the *role* of a representation, obscuring its primary status as a model of a system in the world. The discussion in Sections 3 and 5 gives examples of how our understanding of inference, uncertainty, and knowledge base design can be improved by applying the systems model perspective.

In general, the idea that knowledge bases, like all models, are selective, based on assumptions, and prone to failure has been given almost no consideration in knowledge engineering research. Perhaps the most basic engineering problem in constructing a model is to determine the range of its applicability. How can we determine what cases-situations in the world-will not be successfully modeled? Just as the structural engineer must ensure that his model of a bridge or building will be adequate for every real world event that occurs (given some assumptions) (Petroski, 1985, Weinberg, 1982), the knowledge engineer must certify the validity of his model. Yet, outside of established domains with a strong theory, such as electronics, no strong statements can be made about the accuracy of expert systems, except perhaps that they will work on the cases they have been tested on. While expert systems may only be designed to work for “typical cases,” we must find some way to describe the extremes and articulate procedures for detecting when they occur. Until we shift from continuously blessing our programs with the name of “expert,” and realize that they are only models, it is unlikely that the required engineering methodology will develop.

## 7. Conclusions

Focusing on the function of knowledge bases as models of systems, I have described expert-system problem solving in terms of generic tasks, provided a unifying description of qualitative representations, and related AI to the concerns of traditional science and engineering. Using medical diagnosis as an example, I showed the benefits of this perspective for detecting gaps in a knowledge base and understanding inference in terms of a model-manipulation strategy.

AI knowledge bases contain qualitative models. Describing expert systems has been difficult because a “knowledge base” could be almost anything. Now, confronted with a knowledge base, you might ask: What system is it a model of? Whose model is it? Why is it believed? Is it a classification, state-transition, functional, or structural model? Are these composed? What is the inference procedure? Are situation-specific models selected or constructed? What is the explanatory/predictive or system synthesis capability? For what world? For what task? Under what assumptions? How do you know when it isn’t good enough?

Along these lines, problem solving, learning, and explanation can be reconceptualized in terms of model acquisition, representation, and use. Many researchers have already adopted

this perspective (for example, see (Weiss, et al., 1978, Gaschnig, 1980, Swartout, 1981, Kahn, et al., 1985, **Soo**, et al., 1985)). But our work has barely begun in developing this new science and engineering of qualitative models:

We have **explored** a range of systems of different types: physical, perceptual, cognitive, and social. But the modeling methods are not practically accessible to professionals in other fields.

We now can see that the locus of a model can be strikingly varied: mathematical equations, a physical replica, a computer program, and a mental model. **But we** are struggling to understand **what** a representation is and how it might be confused with “reality” (Smith, 1982, Smith, 1985, Sloman, 1985).

We have developed qualitative models in expert systems for scientific and engineering applications (Sriram and Rychener, 1986). But we have not developed a methodology for testing models that distinguishes between these goals.

We have qualitative models of systems in the world, second order models (e.g., student models), and discourse and instructional models for communication and modification of models. But we are uncertain about how to represent these explicitly and to what extent they can be separated.

We continue to study the evolution of models, their origin and development in the individual, with recent successes in failure-driven and explanation-based learning (e.g., (Kolodner, 1984, Mitchell, et al., 1985)). But this has underscored how models from different domains and different perspectives interact in learning, in sharp contrast with the sparseness of today’s knowledge bases.

We have developed a repertoire of computational methods for representing qualitative models and inference methods. But the relation of these methods to numeric techniques and their psychological aspects remain to be understood (Gentner and Stevens, 1983, Kuipers, 1985, **Patel** and Groen, 1986, Rouse and Morris, 1985).

Knowledge engineering is not just a new kind of programming. **It** is a new methodology for constructing models of systems in the world so they can be automatically assembled, modified, and controlled. We are not so much programmers as engineers, scientists, and perhaps philosophers. If we view our work in this way, consistently attempting to unify it from a modeling perspective, our claims and successes will be better understood.

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