BIB-VERSION:: CS-TR-v2.0
          ID:: STAN//CS-TR-88-1237
       ENTRY:: April 24, 1995
ORGANIZATION:: Stanford University, Department of Computer Science
       TITLE:: Belief as Defeasible Knowledge
        TYPE:: Technical Report
      AUTHOR:: Shoham, Yoav
      AUTHOR:: Moses, Yoram
        DATE:: December 1988
       PAGES:: 14
    ABSTRACT:: We investigate the relation between the notions of knowledge
               and belief. Contrary to the well-known slogan about knowledge
               being "justified, true belief," we propose that belief be
               viewed as defeasible knowledge. Specifically, we offer a
               definition of belief as knowledge-relative-to-assumptions,
               and tie the definition to the notion of nonmonotonicity. Our
               definition has several advantages. First, it is short.
               Second, we do not need to add anything to the logic of
               knowledge: the right properties of belief fall out of the
               definition and the properties of knowledge. Third, the
               connection between knowledge and belief is derived from one
               fundamental principle, which is more enlightening than a
               collection of arbitrary-seeming axioms relating the two
               notions.
       NOTES:: [Adminitrivia V1/Prg/19950424]
         END:: STAN//CS-TR-88-1237